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Penny Wise, Pound Foolish: Why Investors Would Be 
Foolish To Pay a Penny or a Pound for the 
Protections Provided by Sarbanes-Oxley 
I. INTRODUCTION 
“China executed four people, including employees of two of its Big 
Four state banks, for fraud totaling $15 million . . . amidst a high-profile 
campaign against financial crime. The executions [came] after a string of 
arrests in white-collar crime as China prepared to sell shares in its big 
banks.”1
Fortunately, the United States Congress made the decision not to 
attack financial fraud with the same zeal displayed by the government of 
China. As a result, Kenneth Lay, Jeffrey Skilling, Andrew Fastow,2 and 
Dennis Kozlowski3 can all breathe a little easier. In the wake of Enron’s 
collapse—with the stock market sagging, investor confidence damaged,4 
and a rash of newly exposed corporate fraud5—Congress reacted by 
passing the Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection 
Act of 2002, more commonly known as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
 1. Stephen M. Cutler, Sec. Exch. Comm’n, The Themes of Sarbanes-Oxley as Reflected in 
the Commission’s Enforcement Program, Address before the UCLA School of Law (Sept. 20, 2004), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch092004smc.htm. 
 2. Kenneth Lay, Jeffrey Skilling, and Andrew Fastow were among sixteen senior mangers 
of Enron who were sued by the SEC for their role in Enron’s fraudulent schemes. See Carl Ballard, 
Enron: After the Collapse, Online NewsHour (June 2002), available at 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/business/enron/player5.html. 
 3. Dennis Kozlowski is the former Chairman and CEO of Tyco Intl. and was charged with 
securities fraud, conspiracy, grand larceny, and falsifying business records. It is alleged that Mr. 
Kozlowski defrauded Tyco to the tune of over six-hundred million dollars. See Judge Declares Tyco 
Mistrial, CNNMONEY, Apr. 2, 2004, http://money.cnn.com/2004/04/02/ 
news/midcaps/tyco_outcome/index.htm. 
 4. See Press Release, Congressman Michael G. Oxley, Oxley Remarks on Second 
Anniversary of Sarbanes-Oxley, (Oct. 20, 2004), http://oxley.house.gov/ 
News.asp?FormMode=List&ID=1 (noting that the worst month for investor confidence was 
December 2002). 
 5. See Steve Fraser, Hopping Down the Money Trail, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2005, § 7, at 17 
(listing the companies that suffered tremendous losses due to corporate fraud occurring in the last 
months of 2001 and early 2002 including Enron, Arthur Anderson, Worldcom, Global Crossing, 
Tyco, and Adelphia). 
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(the “Act” or “Sarbanes-Oxley”).6 As the dust begins to settle, the 
impact of Sarbanes-Oxley continues to unfold.  
While the ultimate effects of Sarbanes-Oxley remain uncertain, one 
thing has become increasingly clear: Congress, in an attempt to protect 
investors, grossly underestimated the costs of the Act to publicly traded 
companies and, in turn, the effect of the Act on investors. The cost borne 
by investors goes beyond the hard dollar price of compliance with 
Sarbanes-Oxley: investors are also facing the realistic possibility of 
having fewer investment options as a result of the Act. Due to the 
prohibitive price of compliance, publicly traded small capitalization 
(“small-cap”) companies and foreign corporations are considering 
delisting from U.S. stock exchanges rather than complying with the Act. 
Similarly, privately held small companies will likely opt not to be listed 
on any of the public exchanges because of the higher compliance costs 
caused by Sarbanes-Oxley and will seek alternative financing. Publicly 
traded small-cap and foreign stocks represent an important part of a 
diversified portfolio, and investors are harmed if fewer publicly traded 
small-cap and foreign stocks are offered in the marketplace.7 
Additionally, investors are generally exposed to greater risks when 
investing in privately held companies that are not required to meet the 
same disclosure standards as publicly traded companies. The protections 
afforded by public disclosure requirements are thereby eliminated, 
leaving investors with even less protection against fraud. Ultimately, 
instead of protecting investors, Congress may have exposed them to 
greater risks. 
Much has been written regarding Sarbanes-Oxley with the focus on 
how the Act impacts various groups.8 Practitioners and legal scholars 
have considered the effect of the Act upon accountants, information 
technology managers, senior executives, and lawyers. However, 
 6. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (to be codified in scattered sections of United States 
Code Titles 11, 15, 28, and 29). 
 7. See generally Henry T.C. Hu, Illiteracy and Intervention: Wholesale Derivatives, Retail 
Mutual Funds, and the Matter of Asset Class, 84 GEO. L.J. 2319, 2362 (1996) (discussing asset 
allocation theory as the most important aspect of investor returns). Asset allocation refers to how 
investments are spread out across asset classes, or how investments are distributed within asset 
classes. Id. 
 8. See, e.g., Justine Kendall, Accountants, Attorneys, and Enron: An Analysis of the Debacle 
and Implications for Future Practice Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 16 REGENT U.L. REV. 459 
(2003) (discussing what Sarbanes-Oxley means for accountants and attorneys); Anjali Parikh, 
Expanding Chief Officers’ Liability and the Promise To Raise Investor Confidence, 4 HOUS. BUS. 
TAX L.J. 357 (discussing the effect of Sarbanes-Oxley on senior management). 
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forgotten in these analyses is the investor—the very person the Act is 
intended to protect. This Comment argues that Sarbanes-Oxley, though 
intended to protect investors from corporate fraud, actually harms 
investors by increasing compliance costs, which outweigh any protection 
provided to investors. The additional costs created by Sarbanes-Oxley 
reduce overall stockholder profit. Furthermore, these costs create an 
incentive for small and foreign companies to avoid or even remove 
themselves from the public marketplace.  
A summary of the purpose and relevant provisions of Sarbanes-
Oxley is presented in Part II. Part III examines the positive aspects of 
Sarbanes-Oxley in an attempt to measure what investors are receiving for 
the money spent on compliance. Part IV addresses the additional costs 
that companies face to be compliant with the Act. Part V discusses the 
ways in which the Act impacts U.S. investors. Finally, Part VI 
recommends that small and foreign companies be exempted from 
compliance with Sarbanes-Oxley, which would eliminate the bulk of the 
negative bite from the legislation and still allow Congress to determine if 
Sarbanes-Oxley provides some investor protection. 
II. SARBANES-OXLEY 
The following is a summary of the first four provisions of Sarbanes-
Oxley—provisions that have had a major financial impact on companies 
that are publicly traded on U.S. markets. The stated purpose of Sarbanes-
Oxley is “to protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability 
of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws, and for 
other purposes.”9 The Act amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
and four other Acts10 to safeguard investors against the possibility of 
financial failure of publicly traded companies primarily “by improving 
the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures.”11
Title I of the Act established the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board (“Oversight Board”) to oversee the auditing process of 
public companies,12 to establish audit rules,13 and to enforce compliance 
 9. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. at 745. 
 10. Sarbanes-Oxley also amended various parts of the Securities Act of 1933, the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, the Investment Advisor Act of 1940, and parts of related 
criminal code sections under Title 18 of the United States Code. 
 11. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. at 745. 
 12. 15 U.S.C. § 7211(a) (Supp. II 2002). 
 13. Id. § 7211(c)(2). 
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by accountants.14 Title I also assigned supervision of the Oversight 
Board to the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC” or the 
“Commission”).15
Title II of the Act amended section 10A of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 by including additional requirements for independent 
auditors in an attempt to strengthen the meaning of “independent 
auditor.”16 To this end, under the amended Securities and Exchange Act, 
auditors are prohibited from contemporaneously providing other 
consulting services while performing audit services for a publicly traded 
company.17 Furthermore, Title II prohibits lead audit partners from 
performing audit services for the same client for more than five 
consecutive years, which requires the accounting firm to shift the lead 
audit partner to a different account after five years.18 The Act also 
requires auditors to report to the company’s audit committee the 
procedures and communications carried out between the auditor and 
management in an effort to ensure independence between the auditor and 
company management.19
Title III of Sarbanes-Oxley amended section 10A of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 by adding new requirements relating to audit 
committees for publicly traded companies.20 This addition to the 1934 
Act “directs the national securities exchanges and national securities 
associations to prohibit the listing of any security of an issuer that is not 
in compliance with the requirements of any portions of paragraph (2) 
through (6).”21 Paragraph (2) outlines the oversight responsibility of the 
audit committee in relation to the registered public accounting firm.22 
Paragraph (3) requires that the audit committee consist of independent 
members of the board of directors.23 Independence, for purposes of the 
audit committee, precludes anyone from accepting “any consulting, 
advisory, or other compensatory fee from the issuer.”24 A member of the 
 14. Id. § 7211(c)(3), (4). 
 15. Id. § 7217 (Supp. II 2002). 
 16. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. at 771. 
 17. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(g) (Supp. II 2002). 
 18. Id. § 78j-1(j). 
 19. Id. § 78j-1(k). 
 20. Id. § 78j-1(m). 
 21. Id.  
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
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audit committee may not be “an affiliated person of the issuer or any 
subsidiary thereof.”25 Paragraphs (4) through (6) are not overly 
burdensome to companies, and thus are not important to this analysis.26
Title III also requires that the principal executive certify financial 
reports.27 In doing so, the principal executive becomes responsible for 
establishing and maintaining internal control procedures and certifies that 
the internal control procedures have been reviewed for effectiveness 
within ninety days of certification.28 Additionally, certification requires 
that the principal executive disclose any deficiencies in the control 
procedures to the audit committee and the auditor,29 including any 
fraud—material or not—involving management or employees who have 
a role in the company’s internal controls.30 Moreover, if the issuer is 
required to prepare a restatement due to misconduct with any securities 
law financial reporting requirement, the chief executive officer and chief 
financial officer may be required to repay to the company any bonuses 
received or profits realized from the sale of the issuer’s stock for the 
twelve-month period.31
Title IV of the Act amended section 13 of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, which outlines the requirements for disclosures in periodic 
reports.32 The amendment requires the disclosure of off-balance sheet 
transactions and establishes new rules for pro forma figures.33 Section 
404 of Sarbanes-Oxley commands management to include an “internal 
control report”34 in any annual report required by sections 13(a) or 15(d) 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The internal control report must 
contain an assessment of the effectiveness of the internal control 
structure and of the issuer’s procedures for financial reporting.35 The 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. Paragraph (4) requires audit committees to establish procedure for complaints; (5) 
grants authority to the audit committee to hire counsel or advisors; and (6) requires the issuer to 
provide necessary funding to the audit committee. Id. 
 27. Id. § 7241(a).  
 28. Id. § 7241(a)(4). 
 29. Id. § 7241(a)(5)(A). 
 30. Id. § 7241(a)(5)(B). 
 31. Id. § 7243(a)(1). 
 32. Id. § 78m. 
 33. Id. § 78m(j). Interestingly, off-balance sheet transactions were partly to blame for 
Enron’s demise. 
 34. Id. § 7262. 
 35. Id. § 7262(a)(1), (2). 
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registered public accounting firm that prepares the issuer’s audit report 
must attest to and report on the issuer’s assessment.36
Additionally, Title IV requires the SEC to engage in a regular and 
systematic review of financial reports required under section 13(a) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.37 Sarbanes-Oxley places a huge 
burden on the Commission by requiring it to review, at least once every 
three years, all issuers required to file under sections 13(a) and 15(d) of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.38 Also, the amended Act requires 
that the company’s audit committee contain at least one member who is a 
“financial expert.”39 The remaining titles within Sarbanes-Oxley do not 
add significant costs to publicly traded companies.40  
 36. Id. § 7262(b). 
 37. Id. § 7266(a). 
 38. Id. § 7266(c). 
 39. Id. § 7265. The Act does not define a financial expert; rather the Act indicates that “the 
Commission shall consider whether a person has, through education and experience as a public 
accountant or auditor or a principal financial officer, comptroller, or principal accounting officer of 
an issuer, or from a position involving the performance of similar functions,” which include  
(1) an understanding of generally accepted accounting principles and financial 
statements;  
(2) experience in  
(A) the preparation or auditing of financial statements of generally comparable 
issuers; and  
(B) the application of such principles in connection with the accounting for 
estimates, accruals, and reserves;  
(3) Experience with internal accounting controls; and  
(4) an understanding of audit committee functions.  
Id. 
 40. Title V is entitled “Analyst Conflicts of Interest” and deals with analysts’ conflicts of 
interest. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 501, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. at 791.  
  Title VI is entitled “Commission Resources and Authority” and appropriates funds to the 
Securities and Exchange Commission to carry out its role. Id. §§ 601–604, 116 Stat.  
at 793.  
  Title VII is entitled “Studies and Reports” and thus requires the Comptroller General of 
the United States to conduct a study regarding consolidation of public accounting firms, report 
regarding credit rating agencies, and report on violators and violations prior to commencement of the 
Act. Id. §§ 701–705, 116 Stat. at 797.  
  Title VIII of Sarbanes-Oxley is known as the Corporate and Criminal Fraud 
Accountability Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. at 805 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1501 (Supp. II 2002)). It imposes criminal penalties for altering documents, 18 U.S.C. § 1519 
(Supp. II 2002), extends the statute of limitations for securities fraud claims, id. § 1658, and provides 
protection to employee whistleblowers,  id. § 1514A.  
  Title IX is known as the White-Collar Crime Penalty Enhancement Act of 2002. 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 901, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. at 805 (codified as amended at 
18 U.S.C. § 1341 (Supp. II 2002)).  
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Sarbanes-Oxley significantly altered the corporate governance 
landscape for companies that trade on U.S. exchanges. However, the 
more difficult question is whether the Act provides investors with 
adequate protection from corporate fraud at a reasonable price. 
III. WHAT INVESTORS ARE RECEIVING AS 
A RESULT OF SARBANES-OXLEY 
Sarbanes-Oxley made noticeable changes to the regulatory landscape 
for publicly traded companies, and some of the changes may work to 
positively affect investors. Like any business decision, the positive 
effects created by Sarbanes-Oxley should be measured against the costs 
of acquisition.  Investors are only paying too much for the Act if the 
benefits do not exceed the costs.  Thus, the positive aspects of Sarbanes-
Oxley also must be considered.  In analyzing the intended benefit of 
Sarbanes-Oxley, Part A will focus on the provisions of the Act that 
clearly add value to investors.  Part B will consider whether investors are 
receiving the right protection by focusing on portions of the Act that are 
intended to provide positive benefit to investors but will not likely 
achieve the desired result in practice.   
A. The Positive Side of Sarbanes-Oxley 
Sarbanes-Oxley is not devoid of positive effects. First, and perhaps 
most importantly, Sarbanes-Oxley requires that any company listed on a 
national stock exchange have an audit committee consisting of 
independent board members,41 including at least one financial expert.42 
Auditors play a critical role in helping to provide investors with a 
transparent picture of what is happening within a company. Chief Justice 
Burger described the auditors’ function as follows: 
By certifying the public reports that collectively depict a corporation’s 
financial status, the independent auditor assumes a public responsibility 
  Title X provides that the chief executive officer “should” sign the Federal income tax 
return for the corporations. Id. § 1001, 116 Stat. at 807. 
  Title XI is known as the Corporate Fraud Accountability Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-
204, 116 Stat. at 807, which relates to tampering with a record or impeding official proceedings, 18 
U.S.C. § 1512 (Supp. II 2002), allows the Commission to order a temporary freeze of the activity 
and force any potential extraordinary payments into escrow until the conclusion of legal 
proceedings, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3 (Supp. II 2002), and gives the Commission the Authority to prohibit 
people from serving as officers or directors, id.  
 41. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (Supp. II 2002). 
 42. Id. § 7265. 
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transcending any employment relationship with the client. The 
independent public accountant performing this special function owes 
ultimate allegiance to the corporation’s creditors and stockholders, as 
well as to the investing public. This “public watchdog” function 
demands that the accountant maintain total independence from the 
client at all times and requires complete fidelity to the public trust.43
The role of audit committee members is key to providing investors with a 
transparent picture. And it appears that audit committees, even those that 
already employed the best practices before Sarbanes-Oxley, have started 
to take their duties even more seriously.44
At the same time, Sarbanes-Oxley has reminded auditors that they 
work for, and report to, the audit committee and not senior 
management.45 Prior to the Act, auditors who were “preoccupied with 
the desire to preserve lucrative auditing and consulting contracts” were 
less than diligent in pointing out aggressive or “creative accounting.”46 
By requiring auditors to report to the independent audit committee,47 
Sarbanes-Oxley has increased the auditors’ independence. This 
requirement helps to eliminate the inherent conflict that arises because of 
the client’s ability to punish the auditor who is supposed to serve as the 
watchdog.48 In theory, auditors are agents of the shareholders, but in 
practice, management is the entity that hires the auditor.49 Thus, if 
management believes “the watchdog barks too loudly, too often, or at 
inappropriate times, then the watchdog can be fired at the cost of ‘losing 
an indefinite stream of future audit fees.’”50 Section 301 of Sarbanes-
Oxley51 can work to alleviate some of the inherent conflict of interest 
between management and the company’s auditor. Removing this conflict 
 43. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817–18 (1984). 
 44. Implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on 
Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. 180–81 (2003) (statement of Keith D. Grinstein) 
[hereinafter Grinstein Statement], available at http://banking.senate.gov/_files/ 
grinstn.pdf. 
 45. Id. at 5. 
 46. Arthur Levitt, Who Audits the Auditors?, WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 2002, at A29. 
 47. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 404, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. at 789. 
 48. Joshua Ronen, Post-Enron Reform: Financial Statement Insurance, and GAAP Re-
visited, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 39, 47 (2002). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Joseph A. Grundfest, Punctuated Equilibria in the Evolution of United States Securities 
Regulation, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 7 (2002) (describing and quoting work of Ronen, supra note 
48, at 47). Joseph A. Grundfest was formerly the Commissioner of the U.S. Securities & Exchange 
Commission (1985–1990). Id. 
 51. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (Supp. II 2002). 
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certainly provides a benefit to shareholders in that the auditor will be 
better able to serve the “watchdog” function when no conflict of interest 
exists. 
Ironically, the reduction of the inherent conflict between 
management and the auditor is even more important now that Sarbanes-
Oxley is in place because the stream of audit fees created by the 
implementation of the Act is developing into a river of audit fees that 
could otherwise magnify the potential for conflict.52  
In spite of the costs imposed by Sarbanes-Oxley, some companies 
are viewing the new regulations as an opportunity to evaluate their 
business and make positive changes that can benefit shareholders. For 
example, section 404 requires that companies create and maintain audit 
controls.53 Mapping out the internal control processes creates an 
opportunity to consider a business from a different angle and rethink the 
ways in which a company operates its business.54 At many companies, 
chief information officers play a key role in using technology to gather 
information for compliance with Sarbanes-Oxley while also gathering 
information that can be utilized by management for other purposes.55 
This information may remove some of the Act’s bite through educating 
employees about the company’s various processes, raising awareness 
within the organization, and allowing the organization to become more 
efficient by eliminating duplicate processes and finding ways to operate 
smarter.56  
B. Does Sarbanes-Oxley Actually Protect Investors? 
Opinions regarding Sarbanes-Oxley’s effectiveness in protecting 
investors are extremely divergent. While nobody is espousing the 
position that the costs of complying with Sarbanes-Oxley are 
insignificant or irrelevant,57 there is some disagreement regarding 
 52. See infra Part IV.A.  
 53. 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (Supp. II 2002). 
 54. See Insider; Profile: Matthew Key, Chief Financial Officer of O2 UK; Upwardly Mobile, 
ACCT. AGE, Oct. 7, 2004, at 16. 
 55. See Steven Rainey, Sarbanes-Oxley 404’s Tax Implications, FIN. EXEC., Nov. 1, 2004, at 
50 (providing an example of how companies can benefit by collecting key tax data, which could 
result in tax savings while collecting information to be in compliance with section 404 of Sarbanes-
Oxley). 
 56. Joel C. Quall, Implementing Section 404: A Practical Approach to the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act; Financial Reporting, CPA J., Aug. 1, 2004, at 52. 
 57. See, e.g., Cutler, supra note 1. 
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whether the significant costs of the Act represent a good value for 
publicly traded companies and, in turn, a good value for shareholders.58 
Determining the value to shareholders requires us to consider whether 
Sarbanes-Oxley eliminates the root causes of corporate wrongdoing. This 
Section will discuss the Act’s effect on the ethics of senior management 
and the problem of preventing bad actors from doing bad things. Finally, 
this Section will identify a separate argument that the Act was not needed 
in the first place because the drop in share price of companies like Enron 
was caused by market forces rather than corporate fraud. 
1. Mandated codes of ethics for senior managers under Sarbanes-Oxley 
The fact that regulations cannot stop misdirected people from doing 
wrong is illuminated by considering corporate codes of ethics. Sarbanes-
Oxley attempts to foster greater corporate self-policing by requiring 
companies to adopt a code of ethics (“code”) for senior financial 
officers.59 In the alternative, companies that fail to adopt a code are 
required to report and give an explanation as to why they have not 
adopted a code.60 Legislators have required these types of codes “after 
each modern wave of corporate wrongdoing.”61 Nevertheless, fraud 
continues to occur. For example, Enron had a corporate code that 
prohibited an employee from 
participat[ing] . . . in the profits of any other entity which does business 
with or is a competitor . . . unless such ownership or participation has 
been previously disclosed in writing to the Chairman of the Board . . . 
and such officer has determined that such interest . . . does not 
adversely affect the best interests of the Company.62
 58. Multiple Impacts of Sarbanes-Oxley, PRACTICAL ACCT., Jan. 1, 2005, at 6. This article 
reports on the results of the J.D. Power and Associates 2004 Audit Firm Performance Study. Id. For 
the study, 1007 audit committee chairs and 944 chief financial officers were interviewed. Id. The 
study indicated that “almost nine out of ten CFOs say the cost of implementing the new rules and 
procedural requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley are greater than the benefits of those changes.” Id. 
 59. 15 U.S.C. § 7264 (Supp. II 2002). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Note, The Good, the Bad, and Their Corporate Codes of Ethics: Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley, 
and the Problems with Legislating Good Behavior, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2123, 2124 (2003) 
[hereinafter Note, Problems with Legislating Good Behavior]. 
 62. WILLIAM C. POWERS, JR. ET AL., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION BY THE SPECIAL 
INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF ENRON CORP. 44 n.8 (2002), 
available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/sicreport/sicreport020102.pdf (quoting 
Enron’s Code of Conduct).  
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The Special Investigative Committee of the Board of Directors of Enron 
Corporation pointed out that Enron’s officers failed to comply with the 
firm’s stated code of ethics.63  
This example emphasizes that people who choose to be dishonest 
will not be deterred by a code of ethics. Representative Jackson-Lee 
explained to her colleagues that corporate codes may just be “empty 
gesture[s] since ‘those corporations with a sound moral base do not need 
it and for the others it is just a fig leaf.’”64 Therefore, while some 
companies do not need a code of ethics to act morally, and others may 
use these codes as a shield, it is important to consider what effect 
mandatory codes of ethics will have on publicly traded companies. 
One potential effect of the Act’s mandate to draft codes is that 
companies might draft ambiguous codes to avoid requirements of waiver 
disclosure. Companies can give investors a false sense of security that 
senior managers are concerned with ethics while a nebulous code could 
allow senior managers the necessary wiggle room to act in a manner that 
is contrary to what an investor would deem ethical but still be in 
compliance with the drafted document. Thus, the Act’s code-of-ethics 
requirement might hurt, rather than benefit, investors by giving them a 
false sense of security.  
The SEC’s regulations relating to section 406 of the Act require 
companies to make their codes of ethics available to the public65 and 
report any waivers to their codes of ethics on a Form 8-K or on their 
websites.66 This disclosure requirement is a crafty way to encourage a 
company to exercise caution in granting code-of-ethics waivers lest 
investors criticize the company for granting too many waivers.67 But 
shareholders and regulators perceive waivers to the codes of ethics in a 
negative light.68 Therefore, to avoid such negative reaction by investors, 
shareholders, and regulators, the companies might relax the ethical 
standards of their codes, which ultimately will hurt the shareholders. 
 63. Id. at 1–28, 46–47, 68–72, 77. 
 64. 148 CONG. REC. H5462-02, 5472 (daily ed. July 25, 2002) (statement of Rep. Jackson-
Lee) (quoting an unnamed CEO’s description of corporate codes of ethics). 
 65. This disclosure is required by Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 406–407, Pub. L. No. 107-
204, 116 Stat. 745, 789 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 7262 (Supp. II 2002). See also 17 C.F.R. 
§§ 228.406, 249.406 (2003). 
 66. Id. 
 67. See Note, Problems with Legislating Good Behavior, supra note 61, at 2131–35. 
 68. Id. at 2137–38. 
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In addition to negative perceptions, companies and their shareholders 
will be exposed to a greater risk of litigation if investors begin to second-
guess code waivers as hindsight makes it apparent that the issuance of a 
particular waiver by a corporate board was a bad business decision.69 
Armed with hindsight, and under the careful command of aggressive 
securities lawyers, investors are more likely to bring harassing lawsuits if 
a stock-price drop occurs subsequent to a company’s code-of-ethics 
waiver.70 To protect themselves from harassing lawsuits, companies will 
likely begin drafting “nebulous documents that are not illuminating 
either to their own management [or] the public.”71 This increased cost of 
defending lawsuits (sometime even frivolous ones) ultimately hurts 
investors when the litigation costs negatively impact earnings and impair 
investor confidence.72
2. Bad actors subject to fear and greed are unlikely to be deterred by 
Sarbanes-Oxley 
Sarbanes-Oxley does not protect investors because the Act does not 
address the real problem—fear and greed.73 Fear and greed were fed by 
the distribution of options, combined with increased control by investors 
in managing their pensions and with the introduction of online trading, 
 69. Id. at 2138. 
 70. Id. at 2140. 
 71. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Letter from Dov Seidman, Chairman and Chief 
Executive Officer of LRN, The Legal Knowledge Company, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (Dec. 2, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
rules/proposed/s74002/dseidman1.htm). 
 72. Frivolous lawsuits were addressed by Congress with the adoption of the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified at 
15 U.S.C. §§ 77–78 (2000) and 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (2000)). The Act codified a securities fraud action 
and adopted stronger pleading requirements in an attempt to prevent claims that lacked merit. Prior 
to the passing of the PSLRA, plaintiffs’ lawyers would use professional plaintiffs (investors who had 
small holdings in all publicly traded companies) to bring securities fraud claims against any 
company that suffered a significant decline in share price. By being first to file, the attorney would 
become lead counsel and would benefit from any fees generated by settlement. Companies would 
often settle claims rather than go through the expense of discovery. Requiring the filing of notice 
when a company allows a waiver from the company’s mandated code of ethics could resuscitate this 
race to the courthouse as plaintiffs’ lawyers watch for price drops and then look to see if a waiver 
had been granted. See generally Tiffany M. Wong, Defendants’ Standing To Oppose Lead Plaintiff 
Appointment Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 833 
(discussing the market conditions that led to the passing of the PSLRA, which included the use of 
professional plaintiffs and the filing of a lawsuit prior to knowing if the company has engaged in any 
wrongdoing). 
 73. John L. Latham, The Legislative and Judicial Response to Recent Corporate Governance 
Failures—Will It Be Effective?, 5 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 73, 81 (2003). 
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thus creating an environment that exerted tremendous pressure on senior 
management to reach earnings expectations in the marketplace.74 Under 
such pressure, companies became fearful of disappointing the market and 
wiping out value, which created incentives to “finesse financial 
issues.”75  
As management was feeling pressure to exceed the earnings 
expectations of Wall Street, a scenario for disaster began to unfold as 
employers began to shift away from traditional pension plans to defined 
contribution plans (401(k) plans).76 Additionally, retail investors began 
to trade stocks more actively with the advent of online trading.77 
Investors, now with more control over their retirement assets and instant 
access to the marketplace with low transaction costs,78 feared that they 
would miss out on the tremendous growth in the stock market.79 
Everyone wanted a piece of the action.80 Fear and greed affected people 
in unexpected ways: now, many were actually afraid not to invest in the 
market.81 Investors believed that not being in the market exposed them 
to the risk of not getting their share of the money. Valuations reached 
extraordinary levels, and many companies traded at very high prices82 
despite the fact that some of these companies had very few prospects of 
actually generating earnings within the foreseeable future. 
Significant wealth was at stake each quarter. Investors anxiously 
awaited earnings announcements that resulted in huge market swings 
upward when companies exceeded the expectations and, conversely, 
 74. Id. at 82. 
 75. Id. 
 76. See Salvatore J. Papa, Note, The Current Crisis of I.R.C. § 401(k): Is Providing 
Investment Advice the Proper Solution? The Misguided Focus on Investment Advice Instead of 
Investment Education, 38 NEW ENG. L. REV. 371 (2004). Employer sponsorship grew by 900% 
between 1984 and 1993. Id. at 377. In 1984, there were 7.5 million participants in 401(k) plans. Id. 
at 378. The number of participants in 401(k) plans grew to over 42 million people by 2000. Id. 
 77. See Jason F. Bedell, Comment, Web Site Outages: Isn’t It Time To Do More?, 82 OR. L. 
REV. 159 (2003). In 1994, online trading did not exist. Id. at 161. By 1999, there were over 9.7 
million online trading accounts. Id. at 161–62. 
 78. For example, at Scottrade online brokerage, an investor can trade an unlimited number of 
shares for seven dollars. See http://www.scottrade.com. 
 79. See Theresa A. Gabaldon, Book Review, The Role of Law in Managing Market Moods: 
The Whole Story of Jason, Who Bought High, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 111, 112 (2000) (reviewing 
Robert J. Shiller’s Irrational Exuberance, which describes nonparticipation as a “loser’s game”). 
 80. See  id. at 115. 
 81. See id. 
 82. Ordinarily, this would be phrased as “trading at high multiples” by investment 
professionals. However, the term “multiples” implies that companies had earnings—something that 
was often missing in the late 1990s. 
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huge market swings downward when companies disappointed Wall 
Street. However, in some cases, finessing by management went beyond 
what is legal and, upon discovery, management actions resulted in 
substantial losses by investors. Unfortunately, Sarbanes-Oxley does not 
address the fear and greed that caused the pressures upon senior 
management leading them to finesse the system.83 Thus, under similar 
conditions, the “finessing” would simply happen again as managers try 
to figure out how to try to make the system work to their advantage 
rather than disappoint shareholders.84 This type of behavior has led one 
management expert to warn in response to Sarbanes-Oxley that managers 
may “begin to gear the system to comply with the regulations in such a 
way that you’re adhering to the letter of the law but the actual spirit of it 
has totally evaporated.”85 As managers begin to spend time navigating 
around the disclosure regulations to avoid violations, investors are 
harmed by not receiving the information the Act intends them to 
receive.86 In turn, it becomes apparent that Sarbanes-Oxley provides, at 
most, only limited protection against corporate fraud to investors. 
The lesson for investors becomes simple: “one should not assume 
that an effective system of corporate governance will always prevent 
fraud by skilled and determined bad actors.”87 For example, one 
provision of the Act states that the chief executive officer (CEO) and the 
chief financial officer (CFO) may be required to repay bonuses received 
if they are found to have committed a fraud.88 However, not everyone 
“believes that a CEO or CFO standing at the crossroads between 
committing a financial fraud that will probably be worth millions of 
dollars to him” will be deterred by the requirement of returning his or her 
bonus if caught.89 Thus, Sarbanes-Oxley may do very little “to deter the 
 83. Latham, supra note 73, at 81–82. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Jeffrey L. Seglin, The Right Thing; Will More Rules Yield Better Corporate Behavior?, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2002, § 3, at 4 (quoting Jeffrey E. Garten, Dean of the Yale School of 
Management). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Peter C. Kostant, Sarbanes-Oxley and Changing the Norms of Corporate Lawyering, 
2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 541, 543. 
 88. 15 U.S.C. § 7243 (Supp. II 2002). 
 89. Latham, supra note 73, at 79 (mentioning how preexisting provisions of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, which dealt with relationships between companies and their auditors, 
allowed the SEC to bring actions for aiding and abetting and contained provisions detailing the 
obligations of officers or directors regarding the accuracy of financial reporting). 
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crooks, those people that really intend to do bad things.”90 History shows 
us that some managers will succumb to temptation regardless of the 
regulatory environment at the time. This is evidenced by corporate 
wrongdoings that have occurred under various regulatory schemes over 
the last one hundred years.91 Congress reacted to these wrongdoings by 
promulgating new legislation, yet corporate fraud still exists.92
3. Corporate fraud is not to blame for investor losses in companies like 
Enron 
Some argue that Sarbanes-Oxley was not needed at all and point out 
that the Act was passed in response to a rash of corporate fraud.93 The 
supporters of this position aver that there is actually no consensus that 
the post-Enron market decline was caused by the Enron scandal.94 For 
example, Ken Lehn, a former Chief Economist at the SEC, has 
demonstrated that post-Enron price declines in U.S. equity markets were 
comparable to the declines in equity prices in other developed countries 
that had not experienced “high profile accounting and governance 
scandals.”95 Lehn notes that stock prices had begun to decline before the 
discovery of scandal at Enron and other companies.96 Lehn thus argues 
that fundamental factors in the marketplace, rather than a “crisis in 
confidence,” are to blame for market declines in March 2000, and that 
corporate scandals had only a “small effect on stock prices in the U.S.”97 
Proponents of this view contend that if Enron’s effect on stock prices 
was not significant, there was no need for Congress to make significant 
changes in the regulatory landscape. Accordingly, an argument exists 
that Sarbanes-Oxley was not a reaction by Congress but an overreaction. 
 90. Id. at 82. 
 91. See generally JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET, A HISTORY OF 
THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE (1995) (giving a 
historical perspective of the market crises and related regulatory reactions beginning with the stock 
market crash in 1929 through the late 1970’s). 
 92. See generally id. 
 93. See Neil H. Aronson, Preventing Future Enrons: Implementing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
of 2002, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 127, 132 (2002) (arguing that in addition to Sarbanes–Oxley, more 
regulation of public companies is necessary to “protect investors against the risk of accounting fraud 
and insider trading”).  
 94. Grundfest, supra note 50, at 3 (citing Kenneth Lehn, Fixing the Corporate and Financial 
Sectors: What to Do?, Katz Sch. of Bus., Univ. of Pittsburgh, presented before the Pa. Newspaper 
Ass’n (Sept. 2002)). 
 95. Lehn, supra note 94. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
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IV. THE COST OF THE ACT ON PUBLICLY TRADED COMPANIES  
Any new regulatory framework has costs, and Sarbanes-Oxley is not 
an exception. Due to the hasty passage of the Act, Congress failed to 
ascertain the magnitude of all possible costs and the resulting financial 
drain on the companies that would be required to comply with the Act’s 
provisions. Compliance with Sarbanes-Oxley imposes four types of costs 
on a corporation. First, there are increased costs associated with the 
required additional auditing services. Second, compliance places 
additional responsibilities on members of corporate boards, increasing 
board members’ workloads, and requiring increased compensation. 
Third, compliance also creates an opportunity cost as companies spend 
time and resources complying with Sarbanes-Oxley rather than focusing 
on core business activities that could lead to increased earnings. Finally, 
indirect costs are incurred by corporations when they expend resources 
as part of the compliance effort that could have been utilized in a more 
productive and profitable manner. This Part will examine these types of 
costs and then focus on the effect the costs are having on small and 
foreign companies trading on U.S. markets. Ultimately, investors would 
be better off if companies were not required to comply with Sarbanes-
Oxley. The damage to investors from increased costs and inefficient 
allocation of resources and time by the companies outweighs the 
protections provided by the Act.  
A. Costs Resulting from Additional Auditing Services 
First, the Act creates an increased need and demand for auditing 
services.98 Section 404 of the Act requires companies to establish 
internal audit controls that are attested to by the audit firm.99 Today, 
audit firms report having more work than ever before,100 resulting in 
vastly increased auditing costs to companies. By one estimate, in the first 
year after the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley, the total increased cost for 
auditing services caused by section 404 alone will reach approximately 
 98. For example, Title III of Sarbanes-Oxley established additional guidelines for audit 
committees and requires procedures to certify a company’s internal control structure. 15 U.S.C. § 
7241 (Supp. II 2002). 
 99. Id. § 7262. 
 100. James Greiff, Sarbanes-Oxley Becomes “Open Checkbook” for KPMG, Ernst & Young, 
BLOOMBERG, Nov. 4, 2004, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/ 
news?pid=10000103&sid=aAlUCtlfw9DI&refer=us. 
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seven billion dollars.101 Unfortunately for companies, the compliance 
costs are recurring because attestation is required annually.102
The impact of these compliance costs varies, however, depending on 
the company’s size and existing practices. Naturally, companies that 
need to implement more controls will have higher costs. At the high end, 
American International Group Inc. (AIG) warned its shareholders during 
recent shareholder meetings that the new regulations could cost the 
company as much as three hundred million dollars.103 Even when 
compared with AIG’s annual operating expenses of twenty billion 
dollars, three hundred million is no small figure.104 Few other companies 
have claimed their compliance costs as being in the same range, but that 
does not mean that compliance costs have been insignificant. For 
example, General Electric has indicated that its compliance costs with 
Sarbanes-Oxley will reach thirty million dollars annually.105
A recent survey conducted by Financial Executives International106 
(FEI) provides a broader understanding of the increased costs companies 
are being forced to pay in order to comply with Sarbanes-Oxley. In 
March of 2005, compliance cost data was gathered from 217 companies 
with average annual revenues of five billion dollars.107 For the 
companies responding to the survey, the average cost to comply with 
section 404 was over four million dollars.108 While this number 
represents average compliance costs, larger companies paid substantially 
more in compliance costs.109 For example, companies with revenues in 
excess of five billion dollars reported that compliance costs were 
 101. Amy Borrus & David Henry, Honesty Is a Pricey Policy, BUS. WK., Oct. 27, 2003, at 100. 
 102. 15 U.S.C. § 7262. 
 103. John Gray, Down the Drain?, CANADIAN BUS., July 19, 2004, at 67. The new regulation 
costs are in addition to what the company was spending previously on auditing services. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Bruce Bartlett, The Crimes of Sarbanes-Oxley: Washington’s Rushed Post-Enron 
Regulations Are Hurting Business, NAT’L REVIEW ONLINE, ¶ 5, May 25, 2004, 
http://nationalreview.com/nrof_bartlett/bartlett200405250811.asp. 
 106. Financial Executives International is a professional organization consisting of chief 
financial officers and other senior executives. See http://www.fei.org. 
 107. Press Release, Fin. Executives Int’l, Sarbanes-Oxley Compliance Costs Exceed Estimates 
(Mar. 21, 2005), available at http://www.fei.org/download/ 
404_pr_3_21_2005.pdf. 
 108. Id. (noting that the actual figure was $4.36 million). Again, these costs are in addition to 
what the company was spending previously on auditing services. 
 109. FIN. EXECUTIVES INT’L, FEI SPECIAL SURVEY ON SARBANES-OXLEY SECTION 404 
IMPLEMENTATION EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2–3, (July 2004), http://www.fei.org/download/ 
SOXsurveyjuly.pdf. 
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approximately eight million dollars.110 Not surprisingly, the costs 
reported by the various companies corresponded to the size of the 
business—larger companies having higher costs than smaller ones.111
While costs are higher for large companies, small companies bear a 
disproportionately negative burden because small companies are less 
capable of coping with the additional costs, which do not generate 
additional revenue.112 Some smaller companies are paying as much as 
larger companies to comply with the Act. For example, FlowServe, an 
industrial equipment maker, will pay fifteen million dollars during a six-
month period to comply with Sarbanes-Oxley.113 This figure represents 
almost one-third of FlowServe’s 2003 profits.114 Typically, a reduction 
in profits of this magnitude does not bode well for a company’s stock 
price. In fact, stock price can fall significantly when a company misses 
its earnings forecast by even a small margin.115 Thus, if a company’s 
earnings dropped by as much as one-third due to the increased 
compliance costs caused by Sarbanes-Oxley, the stock price would also 
likely suffer a significant decrease. Because publicly held smaller 
companies do not have the resources to rebound after spending huge 
amounts on accounting services, they could face serious challenges 
trying to stay afloat. 
 Audit costs have risen to the point that even the accounting firms that 
stand to benefit from the increased spending are concerned about 
Sarbanes-Oxley related spending levels. Sarbanes-Oxley was originally 
viewed by accountants as a regulation that punished the profession for 
ethical breaches; however, companies now view the Act as a “full 
employment Act” for those same accountants.116 In fact, the public 
accounting industry has become one of the Act’s biggest beneficiaries 
 110. Id. at 4. 
 111. Id. at 2–3. 
 112. Del Jones, Sarbanes-Oxley: Dragon or White Knight?, USA TODAY, Oct. 20, 2003, at 
1B. 
 113. Finance and Economics: 404 Tonnes of Paper; Internal Audits, ECONOMIST, Dec. 18, 
2004, at 142 [hereinafter 404 Tonnes of Paper]. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Studies have shown that when growth stocks report small earnings shortfalls, this leads to 
disproportionately large share price declines. For a summary of this phenomenon, see Patricia M. 
Dechow & Douglas J. Skinner, Earnings Management: Reconciling the Views of Accounting 
Academics, Practitioners, and Regulators, 14 ACCT. HORIZONS 235, 245–46 (2000). 
 116. Michael Alles, Alexander Kogan, & Miklos Vasarhelyi, The Law of Unintended 
Consequences?: Assessing the Costs, Benefits and Outcomes of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 1 INFO. 
SYS. CONTROL J. 1, 1 (2004), available at http://www.isaca.org/Template.cfm?Section= 
Home&Template=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=16769. 
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despite the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants’ initial 
description of Sarbanes-Oxley as a “de facto government takeover of the 
accounting profession.”117 Grant Thornton LLP, the sixth largest 
accounting firm in the United States, has “more audit work than ever . . . 
before.”118 The director of audit practice at BDO Seidman, LLP, the 
seventh largest accounting firm in the United States, reported that audit 
business is “like nothing I’ve seen, and I’ve been in the field 35 
years.”119 With the huge increase in demand for auditing services, 
average audit costs have increased by sixty percent since the Act was 
passed.120 And companies should expect to pay more for auditing 
services since the potential shortage of qualified auditors will likely grow 
as provisions that apply to the largest 4000 companies will be expanded 
to cover more than 10,000 companies next year.121 Audit costs have 
risen so fast that even accounting firms are concerned. James H. Quigley, 
CEO of Deloitte & Touche, has called for an assessment of the costs and 
benefits after the first year of compliance because “[y]ou just can’t have 
clients this unhappy.”122
B. Costs Associated with a Company’s Board of Directors 
Second, the Act has indirectly increased the costs associated with a 
company’s board. According to Keith D. Grinstein, a member of three 
different boards of directors123 who testified before the Senate 
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs shortly after 
implementation of Sarbanes-Oxley,124 the Act has led to more frequent 
meetings for boards of directors. Such increase in board meetings has 
unsurprisingly led to an increase in compensation to board members.125 
These expanding roles have added further complexity to the 
responsibilities of members of the board of directors and, in turn, have 
 117. See Greiff, supra note 100. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Nanette Byrnes, Cleaning Up by Cleaning Up, BUS. WK., Jan. 10, 2005, at 121. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. (illustrating the point that costs must be significant if the group which benefits the 
most from the legislation is concerned about the burden it imposes on the companies it services). 
 123. In 2003, Grinstein was serving on the boards of directors for Coinstar Inc., F5 Networks, 
and Nextera Enterprises, Inc. Grinstein Statement, supra note 44. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
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led to higher director pay.126 Board member compensation at Fortune 
200 companies is up fourteen percent, and compensation for board 
members for S&P 500 companies on average has increased by fifteen 
percent in both 2003 and 2004.127 Furthermore, due to the new 
regulations, boards are hiring outside lawyers and consultants to help 
them navigate through the new regulatory landscape, thus increasing 
corporate costs even more.128  
C. Opportunity Costs of Increased Compliance 
The third cost that Sarbanes-Oxley imposes on companies results 
from the fact that companies are now required to spend additional money 
on auditing costs instead of focusing spending on more important 
corporate outlays to grow their businesses. Scott McNealy, the CEO of 
Sun Microsystems, compared complying with Sarbanes-Oxley to 
throwing “buckets of sand into the gears of the market economy.”129 In 
other words, as management spends time figuring out how to be 
compliant, it is unable to focus on the company’s core business needs. 
According to the Financial Executives International survey, public 
companies on average expect to spend 25,668 internal hours initially to 
be compliant with the Act.130 By comparison, an automobile can be 
manufactured in approximately twenty staff hours.131 Companies are 
spending their time testing internal controls rather than on profit-making 
tasks. Mario J. Gabelli, the CEO of Gabelli Asset Management, called 
the Act “a major drag on the economy”132 after his company had to 
delay the hiring of twelve needed security analysts in order to pay 
compliance costs.133 A security analyst provides an investment 
management business with research and analysis that can be used by 
money managers or investment advisors to improve money management 
performance. Such enhanced performance adds value to the organization 
 126. See Gary Strauss, Board Pay Gets Fatter as Job Gets Hairier, USA TODAY, March 7, 
2005, at 1B. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Jill M. D’Aquila, Tallying the Cost of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, CPA J., Nov. 2004, at 6, 8. 
 129. Jones, supra note 112. 
 130. FINANCIAL EXECUTIVES INT’L, supra note 109, at 1. 
 131. Jones, supra note 112. 
 132. David Henry, Amy Borus, Louis Lavelle & Diane Brady, Death, Taxes & Sarbanes-
Oxley?; Executives May Be Frustrated with the Law’s Burdens, but Corporate Reform Is Here To 
Stay, BUS. WK., Jan. 17, 2005, at 28. 
 133. Id.  
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by increasing revenue to the organization as new clients are attracted to 
an improved investment performance. When profit-making tasks are 
preempted by compliance duties and expenses, companies’ core 
businesses are likely to suffer. 
However, not everyone is discouraged by the high cost of 
compliance. William McDonough, the Chairman of the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board created by Sarbanes-Oxley, has stated that 
“[s]ection 404 is such an important part of restoring investor confidence 
that it is worth the costs.”134 Of course, many would expect the head of 
the Oversight Board to make this assessment. Donald Nicolaisen, one of 
the SEC’s chief accountants, indicated that the “soaring costs are a sign 
that companies are fulfilling the goals of Sarbanes-Oxley” and making 
financial reporting more transparent.135 Nevertheless, these tributes fail 
to acknowledge that a financial reporting system that is perfectly 
transparent may not inspire an investor when reported earnings are 
lower, which, in turn, causes stock prices to decline. If the costs of 
compliance with the Act are too high, resulting in lower reported 
earnings, Sarbanes-Oxley may actually damage rather than enhance 
investor confidence.136 Such confidence is not built by trust in financial 
statements alone: investor confidence also contains an element of the 
investor’s beliefs about a company’s business prospects going forward, 
which is largely driven by the company’s ability to increase its 
earnings.137
D. The Indirect Costs of Sarbanes Oxley 
 The fourth cost of Sarbanes-Oxley is the indirect effect of 
compliance costs on small public and foreign companies. This Section 
will focus on the response of these companies to lower earnings caused 
by the Act and the regulations promulgated under the Act and the ways 
in which this response is damaging to the investors.  
 134. Greiff, supra note 100, ¶ 47. 
 135. Id. ¶¶ 43–44. However, nowhere in Sarbanes-Oxley did Congress mention that “soaring 
costs” were a desired result of the legislation. 
 136. See Chiaki Kitazawa, Corporate Governance Still Needs Reform, NIKKEI WKLY., Aug. 
19, 2002 (“In order to attract long-term investors, it is crucial to increase earnings steadily and gain 
investor confidence.”). 
 137. Id. 
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1. Small companies’ reaction to Sarbanes-Oxley 
Sarbanes-Oxley and related regulations apply to publicly traded 
companies that list their stock on national market exchanges or national 
security associations138 regardless of market capitalization. Some 
companies are avoiding the burdens of the Act by delisting from these 
exchanges or trading networks.139 In 2003, the year following the 
passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, the number of companies that delisted from 
U.S. exchanges increased by three-hundred percent from the previous 
year.140 Most of the delisting companies indicated they did so to escape 
the high cost of regulatory filings.141 While not conclusive, one study 
found evidence that some of these companies delisted to avoid the 
outside monitoring and scrutiny caused by Sarbanes-Oxley.142 The end 
result is the same: companies are delisting to avoid the high costs or to 
avoid the outside monitoring and scrutiny required by the Act. 
 Unfortunately for the investing public, delisting does not come 
without costs—companies that delisted after Sarbanes-Oxley 
experienced a larger decline in their stock price compared to companies 
that delisted before the Act was passed.143 It is possible to infer that the 
larger decline in value is the result of a view among investors that 
companies have chosen to delist rather than face regulatory scrutiny that 
might uncover accounting irregularities. Despite such a negative reaction 
from investors, a different study by the law firm Foley & Lardner found 
 138. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m) (Supp. II 2002) (including stocks that list on the NYSE, AMEX, 
NASDAQ, or other lesser-known national exchanges). 
 139. As a recent example, Allen Organ Co. announced that it would delist rather than pay 
compliance costs for Sarbanes-Oxley. Steven Markowitz said that Allen Organ Co. would save 
$500,000 in the first year and between $250,000 to $400,000 annually after delisting.  Mr. 
Markowitz said that he did not believe that “paying these costs [was] in the best interest to our 
shareholders.”  Dan Shope, Allen Organ To Delist from Nasdaq, MONITOR, Apr. 12, 2005, available 
at 2005 WLNR 5721294. 
 140. JH, Study Finds Varied Reasons for Rise in De-listings After Sarbanes-Oxley Enactment, 
SEC. WK., Nov. 29, 2004, at 8, available at 2004 WLNR 14196385. Delistings rose from 67 
companies in 2002 to 198 in 2003. Id. It is also important to note that delisting is not an option for 
most large companies because large companies generally exceed the SEC requirements for delisting. 
Id. In order to terminate its registration, a company must have fewer than three hundred stockholders 
of record, or alternatively, a company can have up to five hundred stockholders as long as the 
company’s assets have not exceeded ten million dollars at the end of the last three fiscal years. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. Companies that announce their intention to delist typically drop in price. This drop in 
price is caused by investors’ expectations relating to liquidity and uncertainty regarding the reasons 
for delisting. Id. 
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that twenty percent of companies involved in the survey were 
considering going private to avoid the costs of Sarbanes-Oxley.144 A 
more pessimistic view was expressed by one commentator who 
suggested that one-third of all companies with a market capitalization 
below ten million dollars would eventually either be liquidated, sold, 
merged, or privatized within the next few years due to the increased 
compliance costs.145 Several delisting companies, in their required 
SC13e3 filings,146 blame the amount of resources and management time 
expended to comply with the Act as reasons for going private.147 Chris 
Kramer, an analyst of Strategic Equity Group, believes that “[t]here are a 
lot of public companies out there that will find it increasingly expensive 
to operate without the corresponding benefits of being public because of 
Sarbanes-Oxley.”148
A direct result of delisting is that the delisted company is less 
transparent than one that is publicly traded. Private companies are less 
transparent because they are not required to make public filings or to 
comply with the Act. A CEO of a small company pointed out this irony 
of Sarbanes-Oxley: “Sarbanes-Oxley was designed to provide additional 
corporate transparency and safeguards for the investing public . . . . 
Instead, it is prompting companies like ours to become less 
transparent.”149 This sentiment contradicts the Act’s purpose of 
providing an increased level of transparency to investors.150 Instead, it 
makes sense to try to encourage small companies to maintain their public 
status, which provides investors with at least some level of transparency 
even though it may have been imperfect prior to the Act.  
Not only is Sarbanes-Oxley pushing publicly held small companies 
towards delisting, it is also stopping privately held small companies from 
 144. Bartlett, supra note 105, ¶ 7. 
 145. William D. Holyoak, Corporate Reform: Can Utah’s Small Public Companies Survive 
Sarbanes-Oxley?, UTAH BUS., June 1, 2003, at 42 (discussing the statements of Ronald J. Klammer, 
managing director and president of OEM Capital Corp., in a recent issue of M&A Insider). 
 146. Form SC13e3 is the SEC form for reporting going-private transactions. 
 147. Tim Reason, Off the Street, CFO MAG., May 2003, at 54, 56 (describing the SC13e3 
filings of Coast Dental Services, Inc. and Landair Transport, Inc.). 
 148. Mike Allen, Garden Fresh a Healthy Buy for Fairmont Capital, SAN DIEGO BUS. J., Oct. 
13, 2003, at 13. 
 149. Claudia H. Deutsch, The Higher Price of Staying Public, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2005, § 3, 
at 5 (quoting Donald R. Neel, the CEO of Fidelity Federal Bancorp). 
 150. See supra text accompanying note 9. 
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going public because of high compliance costs.151 Small companies must 
determine if the benefits of being public outweigh the costs of 
compliance with Sarbanes-Oxley. A company must consider several 
factors when deciding whether to be listed on an exchange due to the 
risks associated with such a step.  For example, more than half of 
NASDAQ-listed companies with market capitalizations below $50 
million do not have analyst coverage.152 Without analyst coverage, 
companies are typically unable to attract institutional investors, leaving 
them with depressed and volatile trading prices.153 In turn, low and 
volatile trading prices expose small companies to the risk of a potential 
takeover, litigation, and limited liquidity.154 Conversely, if a public 
company can attract analyst coverage and institutional investors, it has 
significant opportunities for attracting additional financing by issuing 
additional public debt or equity. Such additional financing can be a 
tremendous benefit to a company. 
2. Foreign companies’ reaction to Sarbanes-Oxley 
Foreign issuers have reacted to Sarbanes-Oxley similarly to small 
domestic companies by considering delisting from U.S. exchanges rather 
than complying with the Act. However, the reasons for foreign 
companies contemplating delisting are slightly different than the reasons 
for domestic companies. Sarbanes-Oxley applies to all corporations that 
choose to list their stock on a U.S. exchange regardless of where they 
have incorporated.155 While serving as SEC Chairman, Harvey Pitt 
stated that the regulations promulgated under Sarbanes-Oxley “appl[y] 
equally to all who seek to access U.S. capital markets”156—a stance that 
went against the SEC’s traditional practice of accommodating foreign 
issuers by exempting foreign companies from certain requirements. 
 151. Jill M. D’Aquila, Tallying the Cost of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, CPA J., Nov. 1, 2004, at 6, 
available at http://www.nysscpa.org/printversions/cpaj/2004/1104/p6.htm (stating that costs of going 
public for small companies has increased almost one-hundred percent since Sarbanes-Oxley was 
passed). 
 152. John Sinnenberg, The Pros and Cons of Going Private, FIN. EXEC., Jan. 1, 2005, at 24, 
25. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 24. 
 155. In Search of Honesty, ECONOMIST, Aug. 17, 2002, at 49, 50. 
 156. Anupama J. Naidu, Comment, Was Its Bite Worse Than Its Bark? The Costs Sarbanes-
Oxley Imposes on German Issuers May Translate into Costs to the United States, 18 EMORY INT’L 
L. REV. 271, 276 (2004). 
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Previously, one of the major accommodations given to foreign 
issuers was to allow them to prepare financial reports either according to 
their home standards or International Accounting Standards (IAS), as 
long as the company included an addendum that reconciled the 
differences between the IAS standards and the U.S. Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP).157 Similar exemptions have not been 
provided by the SEC with respect to Sarbanes-Oxley; thus, foreign 
issuers are subject to the same expensive compliance costs as domestic 
corporations. 
Foreign issuers are now forced to consider the costs of complying 
with Sarbanes-Oxley when analyzing the costs and benefits of being 
listed on U.S. exchanges. For most foreign issuers, a listing on a U.S. 
exchange is done in the form of an American Depository Receipt 
(ADR),158 and their shares typically trade both in the U.S. as ADRs and 
overseas as actual shares. Traditionally, foreign issuers have been 
attracted to listing their shares on the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) and on the NASDAQ due to the large market capitalizations of 
these markets.159 Being cross-listed in the U.S. markets also provided 
foreign issuers with increased liquidity, generated excitement over the 
prospect of the company’s expansion, and provided currency for the 
company to acquire other companies within the U.S. market.160 
Historically, companies from less-developed or less-regulated countries 
would also purposely list in the United States to subject themselves to the 
stringent U.S. regulatory standards, thereby providing investors with 
confidence. Being listed on a U.S. exchange gave these companies 
credibility so they could attract investors who ordinarily might not have 
 157. Id. at 278. 
 158. Most investors in the U.S. do not buy actual foreign stock shares but instead buy 
American Depository Receipts (ADR), which are receipts issued by U.S. depository banks 
representing actual shares. See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, INTERNATIONAL INVESTING: GET THE FACTS 
10, available at http://www.sec.gov/pdf/ininvest.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2006). Actual shares of the 
foreign company are placed in escrow, and the ADR is traded on a U.S. exchange. Id. Buying an 
ADR provides certain benefits to investors. Id. First, buying and selling of shares occurs in U.S. 
dollars. Id. Second, the depository bank converts dividends into U.S. dollars and distributes the 
dividends to ADR holders. Id. Finally, the depository bank will arrange to vote the shares per the 
instructions given by the receipt holder. Id. at 11. In practice, most investors do not recognize a 
significant difference between purchasing an ADR or the actual shares—partly because most large-
multinational corporations will often have annual reports prepared in English, so U.S. investors may 
not even be aware that they are buying stock in a foreign company. 
 159. Naidu, supra note 156, at 310. 
 160. Id. at 310–11. 
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purchased their shares in a foreign marketplace.161 But with high 
compliance costs under Sarbanes-Oxley, many foreign issuers are opting 
to list on foreign markets, which do not have the same compliance costs 
and have become more trusted over time. 
But if foreign issuers refrain from listing on U.S. exchanges, U.S. 
investors will be negatively affected. Possessing foreign investments is 
another method of diversifying an investor’s portfolio. Having foreign 
issuers listed on U.S. exchanges provides benefits to U.S. investors in 
two respects. First, it simplifies the investment in foreign companies by 
allowing U.S. investors to make dollar-denominated purchases on an 
exchange in which investors already have confidence. Second, as Judge 
Frank Easterbrook noted in a speech on corporate governance, “firms 
that list their securities in multiple nations’ markets experience both 
lower costs of capital and lower volatility,”162 which benefits U.S. 
investors.  
 Judge Easterbrook nonetheless understood the potential negative 
effects of strict regulatory schemes over securities. He warned that the 
costs of complying with multiple national disclosure systems represented 
a “serious impediment”163 to attracting foreign issuers to U.S. 
exchanges. Indeed, foreign companies have not been sitting idly by, with 
checkbooks open, eager to comply with Sarbanes-Oxley. Instead, they 
have threatened to delist from U.S. exchanges.164 The Confederation of 
British Industry (CBI) recently met with SEC Chairman William 
Donaldson to deliver the message that New York was in danger of losing 
its preferred role as an international location to raise capital.165 This 
threat became more real when Air China chose to list its shares in 
London rather than New York.166 In response to the criticism from 
foreign issuers, the SEC has indicated that it is considering “tweaking” 
 161. Id. at 311–12. 
 162. Frank H. Easterbrook, Derivative Securities and Corporate Governance, 69 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 733, 739–40 (2002). 
 163. Id. at 740. 
 164. Analysis: The State of America, LAWYER, Jan. 24, 2005, at 19 (explaining that British 
Petroleum, Rank Group, and Siemens have all threatened to delist from the NYSE as a reaction to 
the costs of compliance with Sarbanes-Oxley). 
 165. Id. 
 166. 404 Tonnes of Paper, supra note 113, at 142. Losing out on a listing from a major 
Chinese company represents a significant opportunity cost to U.S. investors as China’s economy 
continues to modernize and grow. Id. 
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some rules for overseas companies.167 For now, as Sir Christopher 
Bland, Chairman of British Petroleum, stated, companies have “just got 
to grit [their] teeth and get on with it.”168
V. THE IMPACT ON INVESTORS 
While well intentioned, Sarbanes-Oxley is negatively impacting 
investors. The Act was passed with the purpose of protecting investors 
from the type of severe losses suffered by Enron shareholders. But 
Congress may not have envisioned the possible negative effect of the Act 
on investors. This Part considers direct and indirect ways in which 
investors have been negatively impacted by Sarbanes-Oxley. First, U.S. 
investors have suffered because of the lower earnings caused by the high 
compliance costs mandated by Sarbanes-Oxley. Next, the Act has had a 
negative impact on U.S. investors because some small-cap companies 
and foreign companies have decided to delist or avoid the public 
marketplace rather than comply with Sarbanes-Oxley. Finally, the 
regulatory framework of Sarbanes-Oxley creates an environment that 
discourages companies from staying public or entering the public 
marketplace thereby reducing transparency for investors in those 
companies. 
A. Compliance with Sarbanes-Oxley Results in Lower 
Earnings, Which Hurts Investors 
Investors are ultimately injured by Sarbanes-Oxley due to its 
stringent disclosure requirements that lead to reduced earnings of 
publicly traded companies. When people invest money in stocks, they 
become equity owners. As owners, they are investing in a future stream 
of income. Investors place a value on streams of income, which can be 
measured by a company’s price-to-earnings ratio—a measurement used 
by analysts to determine what investors are willing to pay for a 
company’s earnings.169 This ratio measures the price of the stock against 
its current earnings. Stocks within a particular segment of the market will 
 167. Heather Timmons, SEC Gives Foreign Firms Some Hope on New Rules, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 26, 2005, § C, at 4. 
 168. Kevin Reed, BT Chairman Slams Cost of Sarbox, ACCT. AGE, Nov. 23, 2004, available 
at http://www.accountancyage.com/accountancyage/news/2036433/bt-chairman-slams-cost-
sarbox/index.htm. 
 169. InvestorGuide.com, Fundamental Analysis, http://www.investorguide.com/ 
igustockfundamental.html#peratio (last visited Feb. 1, 2006). 
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typically have similar price-to-earnings ratios. When a company’s 
earnings increase, typically investors will still pay a corresponding 
increase in stock price for those earnings. Thus, rather than the ratio 
changing, stock prices will adjust in a manner that maintains the same 
ratio. When a company’s earnings increase, for the price-to-earnings 
ratio to remain near its previous level, the price of the stock will have to 
rise in relation to the increased earnings.170 Not all stocks within a 
particular market segment will have similar price-to-earnings ratios; if 
investors believe that earnings for a particular company will increase in 
the future, that company’s price-to-earnings ratio will be higher. 
Earnings are also important because investors have more confidence 
in stocks that have steadily increasing earnings.171 By the same token, 
investors have less confidence in stocks that have decreasing earnings. 
Despite its goal to increase investor confidence, the effect of the Act has 
been increased compliance costs leading to decreased earnings, which, in 
turn, has led to decreased investor confidence.172 This result would be 
different if Sarbanes-Oxley could guarantee to remove any potential for 
fraud because investors may be willing to consider earnings diverted into 
compliance costs as a payment for fraud protection insurance. Of course, 
this guarantee cannot exist because, as discussed above,173 bad actors 
determined to cheat the system will simply adjust to the rules. 
Unfortunately, a company’s reduced earnings are not the only way that 
Sarbanes-Oxley negatively impacts investors. 
 170. For example, suppose that a stock trading at $100 per share has earnings of $10 annually. 
The stock’s price-to-earnings ratio is 10. If the company’s earning increased to $12 per share, and 
market conditions were such that a stock of this nature is fairly valued with a price-to-earnings ratio 
of 10, one would expect the stock to trade at $120. Conversely, if earnings weakened so that the 
company’s annual earning was just $8 per share, one would expect the company to trade at 
approximately $80 per share. It is important to note that price-to-earning ratios are not a determinate 
of share price, but are measurement tools to compare one individual stock with another. 
 171. See Kitazawa, supra note 136. 
 172. Providing empirical evidence of investor confidence levels measured for the period 
before Sarbanes-Oxley was enacted as compared to the present is difficult because investor 
confidence is not widely measured like consumer confidence. Also, measuring levels between two 
periods when market circumstances are drastically different (e.g., oil trading at over $60 a barrel) 
make it difficult to determine whether Sarbanes-Oxley has had a positive impact on investor 
confidence levels. However, with these limitations in mind, according to the State Street Investor 
Confidence Index, investor confidence was at a lower level in December of 2005 than in December 
of 2002. See STATE STREET, INVESTOR CONFIDENCE INDEX HISTORICAL DATA, 
http://statestreet.com/industry_insights/investor_confidence_index/ 
historicaldata.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2006). 
 173. See supra Part III.B.2. 
4BRADDOCK.FIN.DOC 5/12/2006 12:51:43 PM 
175] Penny Wise, Pound Foolish: Investors and Sarbanes-Oxley 
 203 
 
B. Delisting of Small Capitalization Stocks  
Negatively Impacts Investors 
Because Sarbanes-Oxley also hurts small companies, it limits the 
availability of small capitalization stock for investors, which represent an 
important part of a diversified portfolio. Small companies—the source of 
small-capitalization stocks—are unable to absorb the compliance costs as 
well as large companies, and some small companies are beginning to 
delist or alternatively refuse to go public in the first place. However, 
small-cap stocks are important to investors because they offer more 
potential for growth than large-capitalization (“large-cap”) stocks.174 
The trade-off for the growth potential provided by small-cap stocks 
comes in the form of increased volatility.175 This is partly because the 
companies that are considered small-cap are typically newer companies 
that are aggressively growing. Inevitably, because some small-cap 
companies fail every year, investing in them inherently contains more 
risk than investing in large-cap stocks trading in highly developed 
markets.176 Despite the additional volatility, many money managers 
recommend that investors include small-cap stocks as part of an 
investor’s asset allocation strategy.177  
At first glance, the concept of making small-cap companies more 
transparent seems appealing for investors. However, the cost of 
providing transparency is either driving small-cap companies from the 
 174. See Ted Griffith, Investment Club Optimistic for 2005; Members Say Choosing Stocks 
not Easy with Falling Dollar, Inflation, NEWS J., Jan. 9, 2005, at 1C (quoting Robert Strauss, senior 
vice president of Greenville Capital Management and a manager of a small-cap mutual fund, as 
saying that “smaller businesses have the potential to deliver profit growth that will outpace larger 
counterparts”). 
 175. Fidelity Investments, one of the largest mutual fund companies in the world, describes 
the risks of small-cap stocks within its Fidelity Small Cap Stock Fund prospectus as follows: 
The value of securities of smaller, less well-known issuers can be more volatile than that 
of larger issuers and can react differently to issuer, political, market, and economic 
developments than the market as a whole and other types of stocks. Smaller issuers can 
have more limited product lines, markets, and financial resources. 
FIDELITY, SUPPLEMENT TO THE FIDELITY SMALL CAP STOCK FUND, FIDELITY MID-CAP STOCK FUND, AND 
FIDELITY LARGE CAP STOCK FUND, PROSPECTUS, June 29, 2005, 
http://content.members.fidelity.com/epro/PROS/315912501/?format=pdf&app=retail; see also Walter 
Updegrave, The Risk in Small Caps, CNNMONEY, Jan. 7, 2005, 
http://money.cnn.com/2005/01/07/pf/expert/ask_expert/index.htm (detailing that small-cap stocks 
have been sixty percent more volatile than large-cap stocks). 
 176. See Updegrave, supra note 175. 
 177. See generally id. (suggesting that in spite of increased volatility, equity investors should 
still limit their equity portfolio to ten to fifteen percent in small-cap stocks). 
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marketplace through delisting or keeping small businesses from the 
marketplace as they choose to stay private in order to avoid compliance 
with Sarbanes-Oxley. Delisting as well as staying private result in even 
less transparency to shareholders. The market for small-caps is already 
difficult because fifty percent of all small-cap companies trading on 
NASDAQ do not have analyst coverage, making it difficult for investors 
to obtain quality and trustworthy research.178 Without an abundance of 
small companies’ information in the marketplace, the data available to 
investors through mandatory quarterly and annual filings is significantly 
better than the information that investors would be able to obtain from 
private issuers. When companies go dark, or choose to avoid public 
status, investors are no longer protected against fraud as Congress 
intended. Furthermore, not only is there less transparency when 
companies delist, but there are also fewer investment choices in the 
marketplace. Investors are hurt when they have fewer choices.  
Reducing investment choices through mass delisting could also 
cause problems for mutual funds.179 For most defined contribution plans, 
mutual funds are typically the vehicle of choice for plan administrators. 
As money flows into mutual funds on a monthly basis, money managers 
have a duty to invest the money within the guidelines outlined in the 
fund’s prospectus. Many mutual funds, to ensure proper diversification, 
place restrictions on the fund manager to prevent the manager from 
taking a large position in any one holding. If fewer small-cap companies 
are available in the marketplace, money managers may not be able to 
find suitable investments for their clients. 
Most important, though, is the fact that investors will have fewer 
choices within a beneficial area of the market if publicly traded small 
companies delist or stay out of the public market altogether. And since 
the Act places extreme burdens on public companies, especially small 
ones, it ultimately injures investors. 
 178. The author of this Comment does not intend to assert that “analyst coverage” is 
necessarily equivalent to “quality and trustworthy research.” 
 179. Mutual funds represent a popular way for investors to invest in small-cap companies. 
Investors pool their money, and a professional money manager chooses the securities to purchase. 
This approach provides investors with instant diversification within an asset class. 
4BRADDOCK.FIN.DOC 5/12/2006 12:51:43 PM 
175] Penny Wise, Pound Foolish: Investors and Sarbanes-Oxley 
 205 
 
C. Investors Are Negatively Impacted as Foreign 
Companies Avoid U.S. Markets 
Investors are attracted to the potential growth opportunities available 
in international stocks, particularly in developing economies.180 Foreign 
stocks can also play a role in reducing overall portfolio volatility. Taken 
individually, foreign stocks have been historically more volatile than 
U.S. stocks.181 However, because foreign stocks do not trade in lockstep 
with U.S. markets, owning foreign stocks can reduce overall portfolio 
volatility.182 Thus, foreign stocks are an important part of an equity 
investor’s asset allocation strategy.183
Increased compliance costs will affect foreign issuers in different 
ways. Foreign companies list on U.S. exchanges for different reasons. 
With the world economy rapidly changing, not all foreign issuers need 
access to U.S. equity markets. Traditionally, companies list on U.S. 
exchanges to give themselves additional credibility and access to capital. 
Today, these benefits play a less significant role for foreign companies 
because these companies can list on well-developed European exchanges 
that now offer similar benefits. This trend becomes problematic when the 
SEC tries to increase its regulatory influence across borders: foreign 
companies may choose to take their shares and go home. If foreign 
companies delist, U.S. investors will be limited to buying those shares 
directly in foreign markets. Expatriating dollars and investing abroad 
creates various headaches184 for U.S investors. 
Purchasing foreign stocks that trade on U.S. exchanges is the most 
practical and least costly method for investors to purchase foreign stocks. 
If foreign issuers choose to delist, or if fewer foreign companies choose 
to list on U.S. exchanges, investors are hurt by not having the ability to 
diversify their portfolio with foreign investments. 
 180. See generally Jeffrey Margolies, International Investing: Is It Right for You? The World 
Is Shrinking and Opportunities Are Growing, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 22, 1994, at 6. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, INTERNATIONAL INVESTING: GET THE FACTS 5-8, 
http://www.sec.gov/pdf/ininvest.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2006). Some countries impose “currency 
controls” that restrict or delay movement out of a country. Id. Other problems include reduced 
trading hours, potential for higher prices charged to foreign investors, limitations on potential legal 
remedies, and different rules of operation for markets. Id. 
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VI. SARBANES-OXLEY: THE ALTERNATIVES 
In the case of Sarbanes-Oxley, the regulations are excessively 
onerous for small and foreign companies. For these types of companies, 
the results of the Act are contrary to its stated purposes because the Act 
harms rather than protects investors by negatively impacting companies’ 
earnings. Operating under the assumption that Congress wants to give 
the Act more time to see if it reduces fraud, Congress can still amend the 
Act to limit its application to large publicly traded companies and 
simultaneously provide relief for U.S. investors by exempting small-cap 
and foreign stocks from the provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley.  
The Act’s continued application to large companies will reduce the 
potential for massive investor losses like the losses experienced in the 
Enron fiasco. Enron was the seventh largest company in the world at the 
time it restated its earnings and revealed its wrongdoings. Investors’ 
losses were measured in the billions of dollars. This level of risk does not 
exist when it comes to small-cap companies. Losses caused by fraud are 
not insignificant at any level, but losses are limited to the individual 
company’s market capitalization. Thus, if a company has a market 
capitalization of twenty million, total losses can not exceed that amount. 
While the losses are limited for small companies, compliance costs 
are still substantial. Compliance costs for a small company are still likely 
to be several hundred thousand dollars annually. For a small company, 
compliance costs can significantly detract from earnings.185 Investors in 
small-cap stocks are better served by managing the risk of fraud through 
traditional method of diversification. Ultimately, investors in small-cap 
companies are paying too high a price for a limited amount of risk 
protection. 
Costs of compliance create a disproportionate burden on the small-
cap issuer while offering less potential-investor protection due to small 
market capitalizations.186 Even modestly educated investors are aware of 
the increased risk of investing in small-cap stocks. If small-cap stocks are 
exempted, investors uncomfortable with the reduced standard of 
corporate transparency are not required to invest in these companies. 
Investors who are not comfortable investing in a company not required to 
comply with Sarbanes-Oxley can choose to invest in those small 
 185. See Socked, CORP. COUNSEL, July 1, 2003, at 16 (detailing the average compliance for 
mid-cap stocks of $2.5 million and providing simple math to illustrate the effects of Sarbanes-Oxley 
on earnings). 
 186. See supra Part IV.A. 
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companies that have voluntarily decided to comply with the Act. This 
allows investors to knowingly take on the potential risk without having 
to suffer through reduced earnings. Exempting small companies does not 
mean that all small companies would not comply. Conceivably, some 
small companies would choose to adopt voluntarily various provisions of 
Sarbanes-Oxley as their business allowed them to both manage the costs 
and attract investors who are ultra-sensitive to transparency concerns.187 
If the benefits of the Act outweigh the costs, companies will voluntarily 
comply in order to attract capital from investors who would only invest 
in companies that have complied with Sarbanes-Oxley. 
For many of the same reasons that apply to small domestic 
companies, Congress should also exempt foreign issuers from 
compliance with the Act. The SEC has historically exempted foreign 
issuers from many SEC regulations,188 and this tradition should continue 
with regard to Sarbanes-Oxley. U.S. investors benefit from being able to 
diversify their portfolios with foreign issuers. Investing in foreign stocks 
on U.S. exchanges is the most desirable option for U.S. investors. On the 
other hand, foreign issuers have options to list on well-developed 
overseas markets and do not necessarily need to be listed on the U.S. 
exchanges. As a result, the domestic exchanges are now forced to 
compete for the listings of foreign issuers, and driving foreign companies 
away due to high compliance costs will only hurt U.S. investors. 
Alternatively, more appropriate legislation could be passed that 
would protect investors without hurting a company’s bottom line. 
Determining where to start does not require us to look past the 
happenings at Enron. Investors who felt the greatest impact are those 
employees who lost their retirement savings and their jobs on the same 
day. To some degree, the tremendous losses189 suffered by Enron 
employees were the result of the same fear and greed that controlled 
 187. Assuming that voluntary compliance were an option, it is unlikely that very small 
companies would voluntarily comply because of the prohibitive cost. Even small companies that 
have internal audit staff may have limited ability to implement a proactive approach because 
compliance with the Act requires a significant amount of the internal audit staff’s time.  According 
to a recent survey conducted by the Institute of Internal Auditors, 63 out of 160 chief audit officers 
polled reported that fifty percent of internal audit staff’s time was being devoted to Sarbanes-Oxley. 
Donald E. Tidrick, “Seize the Moment!:” An Interview With IIA Chairman Betty McPhilimy, CPA J., 
Nov. 1, 2004, at 14, 18. 
 188. Naidu, supra note 156, at 277. 
 189. Enron’s true losses are difficult to determine. Since Enron’s stock price was artificially 
inflated due to misstated earnings created by accounting irregularities, shareholder losses were 
exacerbated by the market removing the artificial inflation. 
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senior managers.190 Enron management encouraged employees to 
purchase Enron stock within the company’s defined contribution plan. 
Rapidly increasing stock prices proved to be too large of a temptation for 
most employees, and when the stock collapsed, employees’ retirement 
savings were gone. Congress could better protect against a repeat of this 
situation by simply amending ERISA191 to not allow employers to 
include company stock within retirement plans. Then, if a company fails, 
the employees’ retirement assets will still be available. As another 
alternative, Congress could protect investors by offering incentives to 
companies that provide appropriate investment options to defined 
contribution participants and that provide training to participants 
regarding effective asset allocation. By following effective asset 
allocation theory, investors who diversify their portfolios will not be 
wiped out when a single holding fails.    
VII. CONCLUSION 
Congress passed Sarbanes-Oxley to try to jumpstart investor 
confidence by improving transparency. In hindsight, the costs of 
Sarbanes-Oxley outweigh the benefits for small and foreign companies. 
Because the costs outweigh the benefits, Congress should exempt small 
and foreign companies from complying with Sarbanes-Oxley. 
The Act is filled with good intentions. But good intentions in this 
case are too expensive. Investors would be better off without Sarbanes-
Oxley because small and foreign companies’ earnings would be higher as 
these companies spend the money earmarked for compliance on growth 
of the companies’ businesses. Furthermore, the Act’s reach extends 
beyond its helpful role when it begins to create an environment in which 
small-cap and foreign companies seek to delist rather than comply with 
the Act because delisting leads to less transparency and more potential 
danger for investors. 
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